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Abstract
In this methodological paper, we introduce a conceptual and empirical framework that
can inform on the position of European firms along Global Value Chains (GVCs).
After taking stock of the most relevant scholarly works, we discuss how important it
is to switch to a network perspective to account for the sophisticated coordination of
webs of producers across national borders. Then, we show how a combination of firm-
level data and I-O tables can be usefully employed to understand: i) the generation
and distribution of economic value among interested stakeholders, ii) the organization
of GVCs by multinational enterprises, iii) the propensity to retain economic value
domestically, and iv) the co-location of production stages in geographical proximity.
For our purpose, we introduce a case study on the global automotive industry, and
we show some interesting stylized facts. Finally, we argue that firm-level evidence
is crucial for the design of evidence-based policies within the Internal Market in the
context of an ever-increasing global interdependence.
∗corresponding author. Mail to: armando.rungi@imtlucca.it. Laboratory for the Analysis of Complex Economic Systems,
IMT School for Advanced Studies, piazza San Francesco 19 - 55100 Lucca, Italy.
1 A network perspective
1.1 From supply chains to production networks
Global Value Chains (GVCs) have become a dominant feature of the Internal Market, as they
encompass an increasing fragmentation of production processes both across EU Members
and with the rest of the world (ECB, 2019). Thanks to decreasing trade barriers, the
production of a good or service is sliced in different elementary tasks carried out wherever
the necessary skills and materials are available at a competitive cost and quality. The result
is an increasing division of labor that comes together with a rising interdependence of firms,
industries, and countries at a global level. Thus, modern economies can be represented as
webs of producers that exchange intermediate inputs within and across national borders,
and we may have a combination of both spider-like and snake-like configurations of supply
networks (Baldwin and Venables, 2013), depending on the technological peculiarities of their
production processes.
Yet, economic theory usually exemplifies GVCs by assuming the existence of linear tech-
nological sequences of productive tasks, i.e., the ’chain,’ oriented on upstream-downstream
segments1 (Costinot et al., 2012; Antràs and Chor, 2013; Alfaro et al., 2019; Antràs and
de Gortari, 2020).
Therefore, in line with theoretical models, linear position metrics are constructed from
U.S. I-O tables, the Downstreamness/Upstreamness (Alfaro et al., 2019; Antràs and Chor,
2018; Antràs and Chor, 2013; Antras et al., 2012), and they have been used in combination
with firm-level financial accounts to test the organization of GVCs and their value generation
by matching with firms’ industry affiliations (Del Prete and Rungi, 2020; Alfaro et al., 2019;
1We register some ambiguity in economics literature about the distinction between a supply chain and a
value chain. Our opinion is that the term supply chain should be used when the interest falls on understanding
the organization of buyer-supplier relationships, whereas the term value chain should be used when one is
more interested in tracking the generation and distribution of economic value. Obviously, there are many
cases when one is interested in how both problems correlate, as for example in following Section 2.4.
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Rungi and Del Prete, 2018; Del Prete and Rungi, 2017). Eventually, Rungi et al. (2020)
demonstrate how both a theoretical and an empirical representation of GVCs as production
networks more usefully catches the recursive nature of many technological processes, when
some intermediate inputs are needed at different stages before completion.
To get a sense of the relevance of a network approach, please consider the supply network
of an Airbus, which we report in Figure 1, as sourced from Brintrup et al. (2017). Each node
represents a supplier and each edge is an input shipment. The graph includes only suppliers
up to a 4-th tier relationship. Still, we can see how dense the network can be and how some
suppliers are more relevant than others because they deliver their inputs to several suppliers
or suppliers, i.e., they are more central in the production process of an Airbus. Eventually,
an exercise of community detection2 on the graph in Figure 1 underlines how suppliers and
shipments gather by industry and geography.
2One of the most important features of network structures is the existence of community structures,
which can be detected by algorithms that start aggregating nodes by looking at how they interact. For a
multidisciplinary review, see Javed et al. (2018).
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Figure 1: The supply network of AirBus
Note: The Figure is sourced from Brintrup et al. (2017), who elaborate on original transaction data from
the Bloomberg database and detect communities of suppliers that gather by geography and industry.
The network includes only up to a 4th tier of supply relationships, hence excluding more upstream
suppliers.
Eventually, the main advantage to switch from chains to networks is that we can under-
stand better how non-linearities in technology and market structures can play a role in:
1. the organization of production within and across countries, when suppliers can either
integrate under the coordination of a unique parent company or they engage in supply
contracts among independent parties;
2. transmitting shocks within and across national borders, because their final impact
depends on the topology of buyer-supplier relationship, which can either buffer or
magnify initial distortions.
In the next paragraphs, we introduce the primitives of a theoretical setup in Rungi et al.
(2020) that clarifies how both problems can be related. Therefore, we show how firm-level
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data and I-O tables can be usefully exploited to understand the network position of firms in
GVCs, and how important it could be for a number of policy areas.
However, we believe it is important to clarify us a problem of definitions, which are
often ambiguous in both economic literature and policy reports. In the following analyses,
we will prefer making a difference between a supply chain (or a supply network) and a
value chain (or a value network). In fact, we define a supply chain (network) as an ordered
series of production stages that are required to finalize a product or a service that is sold
to consumers. Basically, a supply chain takes shape from the technological organization
of the production process, i.e. which elementary production tasks are necessary for the
completion of a product or a service, and how they should be combined in a sequence before
reaching the final consumers. Obviously, a supply chain (or network) becomes global when
production tasks are performed in more than one country. Instead, when we refer to a GVC,
we want to underline how we are interested in the economic value that is generated along
a (global) supply chain (or network) by firms that compensate labor and capital services.
In this context, a firm participates in a GVC if it produces at least one stage of the entire
technological process, and a GVC is eventually a network of firms that trade inputs, whether
they are physical or intangible inputs. Importantly, at each stage a firm adds some value
in a cumulative process along the GVC that stops only with the final delivery of products
or services. From an aggregate perspective, the value produced by firms adds to countries’
GDPs. Hence, based on the locations where tasks are performed, the value added along
GVCs can contribute to the growth potential of different countries.
1.2 Ranking inputs
We start by introducing a fictional production network to provide the intuition for a network
approach to evaluate the technological relevance of an input in a production process. In
Figure 2, nodes indicate firms (production stages) and directed links indicate input deliveries
4
(market transactions). A failure by a supplier 4 to deliver an appropriate input to firm 3
creates a friction that affects the entire GVC, as the shock for the missing delivery is at least
partially passed further downstream to firm 1 and firm 2, which both use input 3 in their
production. For example, one can think of either a price shock or a disruption of the logistics
that can endanger the regular operations of the GVCs. Eventually, if we focus specifically
on firm 1, we find that it can be hit by the same shock coming from firm 4 but:
• through a supply path firm 4 → firm 3 → firm 2 → firm 1;
• and through another supply path firm 4 → firm 3 → firm 1.
More in general, we expect that any downstream firm will be more affected by a distortion
hitting an upstream supplier if: i) firms in the economy rely on more deliveries of (direct
and indirect) inputs; ii) the network is more connected, in the sense that there are more
supply paths through which shocks can run across several production stages. In a nutshell,
the technological centrality of some inputs can have an important role in magnifying the
impact shocks in presence of complex production networks (see also Acemoglu et al. (2012),
Carvalho (2014), Baqaee and Farhi (2018), and Carvalho and Tahbaz-Salehi (2019)).
Figure 2: A fictional supply network, source: Rungi et al. (2020)
Therefore, from our perspective, the basic unit of observation is a path connecting any
two nodes. Any two countries, industries, and firms can be connected by more than one path.
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In turn, paths can include different sequences of countries, industries, and firms. From our
point of view, the most useful notion of network position we should look at in this case is
the eigenvector centrality, whose main intuition is that a node is more important if other
important nodes point to it.
In this framework, a (direct or indirect) input should rank higher because:
1. it is more requested to produce other (direct or indirect) inputs;
2. it is more requested to produce other highly requested inputs.
Thus, one could figure out a nested production function3 of a generic downstream pro-
ducer i operating in a sector k, who considers the deliveries by any generic upstream supplier
j operating in a sector h:















where αk is the amount of budget spent on intermediate inputs by the downstream producer
k and βk is the amount of budget spent on labor. Inside brackets, every ghk is the amount






hk is needed to
simplify computations. Since we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant
returns to scale, we have αk + βk = 1, and
∑
h ghk = 1. The term εh is the elasticity of
substitution in the generic upstream market, and naturally x(k, i, h, j) is the quantity of the
generic intermediate input needed downstream.
Eventually, the matrix G = (ghk)h,k defines the sector level technology, i.e., the actual
supply network of the economy, which can be directly inferred from Input-Output tables.
See Section 1.4 for further discussion and a calibration from the theory.
Crucially, a parameter τh ≥ 1 in (1) introduces the general idea of a friction on an
3For more details, please see Rungi et al. (2020), of which we report here an excerpt to provide  
intuition of the advantages of looking beyond linear sequences. In turn, Rungi et al. (2020) build upon the 
work of Grassi (2017) and Grassi and Sauvagnat (2019).
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upstream market, say a logistic problem during a pandemic shock. When τh > 1, we can
figure out how the h-th input can be used less efficiently in the production process, and such
a shock has consequences on all downstream producers.
In fact, following Rungi et al. (2020), we define the value of an Input Rank as the impact
that such a distortion has on the marginal costs of a (direct or indirect) downstream buyer,









where λ(k, i) denotes the marginal cost of production of a firm i in sector k, ek is the k-th
unit vector, A is the diagonal matrix that collects sector specific intermediate inputs’ cost
shares, {αk}Mk=1, and G is the industry-level technology already introduced before.
Briefly, from this perspective, a shock can cascade through the supply structure and have
an impact on the marginal costs of the downstream producer, which becomes all the more
crucial if that upstream supplier is more central because her inputs are required by more
producers in the network.
In the end of the day, the downstream impact of any shock is:
1. higher if a supplier is more central, because it delivers to other intermediate suppliers
that use the same input in their production processes, as retrieved from its position in
the entire economy G;
2. higher if intermediate suppliers buy more of that specific intermediate input, i.e. the
cost shares {gh1} for an input h1 are higher than cost shares of an input h2 in the
economy represented by G;
3. higher if the overall intensity at which intermediate inputs vs. labor inputs are em-
ployed is also higher, as retrieved from {αk}Mk=1;
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4. higher if the elasticity of substitution in the upstream market, εh is lower, i.e., there
are less competitive pressures in the upstream market.
The latter two items require particular attention. What we are saying is that shocks
of any nature on an upstream market can have a higher impact on downstream buyers if
production processes are less labor intensive. In simple words, if we look at the fictional
network of Figure 2 and there is a shock, say, at stage 4, its impact is buffered if stages 3
and 2 use more labor services than intermediate inputs. A case for competitive pressures
is less evident from (2), but it is there. In a simple setting with monopolistic competition
like Rungi et al. (2020), any supplier builds a markup based on the elasticity of substitution
εh. Thus, a higher markup implies a higher price paid by the downstream buyers through
relatively higher cost shares.
1.3 Shocks on a supply network
In this section, we briefly discuss a few shocks whose transmission could be relevant for policy
making, and how they could transmit along a production network based on the simple setup
we describe in the previous paragraphs. Please note that the exposition of the arguments has
no pretence in terms of formal notation. It is intended as a non-exhaustive and unambitious
list of possible extensions of the more basic setup introduced in Rungi et al. (2020).
Contract enforcement
The quality of a contractual environment is important for the productivity of buyer-
supplier relationships. Following the empirical work conducted by World Bank (2020a),
we can proxy contract enforcement as the time and cost for resolving a commercial dispute
through a local courts. More in general, the efficiency of a court system has an impact on the
workings of an entire economy. In our perspective, we can think of a difficulty in enforcing
contracts as a shock that can be passed downstream to direct and indirect buyers, within
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and across national borders. If it becomes easier for a contracting party to renege on supply
contracts in a market h, we can represent it as a rising τh, i.e. a higher wedge between the
supplier and its direct buyers that cascades downstream through several production paths.
In general, we can generalize the intuition by encompassing other frictions that derive from
market-specific environments, as for example a rising local financial friction.
Trade policy
Although we do not explicitly model international trade in previous paragraphs, it is easy
to understand how a rising trade friction can be plugged in a production network like the one
introduced by Eq. (1). If a supplier and its direct buyers are located in different countries,
then a rising τh can indicate an increasing tariff or non-tariff barrier. Such a wedge would
have an impact on more downstream buyers in any sector k. Both foreign and domestic
transactions will be affected by a trade policy that makes international transactions more
costly, as depending on the network topology introduced in previous paragraphs.
Social distancing As a measure to prevent contagion from the recent pandemic crisis,
social distancing is already having an impact on the organization of production. Work from
home with smart solutions is possible thanks to investment in information and communica-
tion technologies. Yet, we can reasonably assume that labor productivity will be lower, at
least in the short and medium run, before a complete readjustment takes shape. In this case,
we assume that labor-intensive industries will suffer relatively more from lower (labor) pro-
ductivity. In our framework, labor intensity is the inverse of intensity in intermediate inputs,
αk. That is, social distancing will have a stronger direct impact on firms that are active in
sectors where alphak is lower. In turn, given our framework, a lower (labor) productivity
will affect the entire supply network, because all input industries will deliver relatively less
than before. However, more labor-intensive inputs, i.e., the ones that have a lower alpha,
will have a higher (direct and indirect) impact on downstream buyers.
Market competition An increase in competitive pressures upstream has the potential to
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increase productivity of downstream buyers, if we believe in the framework introduced in
Section 1.2. In fact, a higher elasticity of substitution in an upstream market, εh, implies
a lower markup and, thus, a lower price of (direct and indirect) inputs, whose impact on
the marginal costs of downstream buyers depends on the relative positions in the supply
network.
Policy uncertainty Following recent works (Baker et al., 2020, 2016)4, we believe that
an important component of modern economies is policy uncertainty perceived by economic
agents. To provide an idea of how important it is in recent decades, we sketch the global
index following Baker et al. (2016). In fact, as a result of the recent pandemic crisis, the
index of global policy uncertainty has peaked at its maximum over the last two decades,
when data are available. The trend was already rising in the latest years as a consequence of
global crisis, including tariff wars between USA and China. Previously, in 2008 and 2011, we
can spot local peaks corresponding to a global and a European financial crisis, respectively.
Yet, the global index almost doubled in just five months from the beginning of 2020.
4Baker et al. (2016) usefully construct a measure of policy-related economic uncertainty based on three
components: i) a first component quantifies uncertainty by looking at newspaper coverage and text analysis;
ii) a second component catch uncertainty by looking at expiration of tax code provisions in future years; iii)
a third component looks at the disagreement among available economic forecasts. The analysis is available
at a global level and for a number of single countries.
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Figure 3: Global Policy Uncertainty (PPP) from January 1997 to May 2020
Note: The data are sourced from https://www.policyuncertainty.com/. The index is taken with a global
coverage, considering purchasing power parity (PPP). For a description of the methodology, see Baker
et al. (2016).
We presume that the impact of policy uncertainty at a global level adds on top of market-
specific shocks. It is an uncertainty about the policies of the future that can decrease
the propensity of economic agents to invest in the long term. hence further reducing the
productivity of the global economy. A dynamic analysis of investment plans and their impact
on the innovation of production processes is beyond the scope of the framework introduced
in Section 1.2. Yet, we can presume that suppliers in a production network could discount
uncertainty also in the short run, therefore reducing the purchases of both direct and indirect
inputs.
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1.4 An application: the automotive supply network
A nice feature of the framework in Section 1.2 is that it can be directly calibrated on Input-
Output tables. For our purpose, we show an application to the automotive industry by using
alternatively the U.S. Input-Output tables, sourced from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA, 2002), and the world Input-Output tables, sourced from WIOD (Timmer et al., 2015).
On one hand, U.S. 2002 Input-Output Tables by BEA (2002) provide a finer-grained
representation of the technological structure of an economy, because it disaggregates rela-
tionships among 425 industries (i.e., nodes) generating 51,768 transactions (i.e., edges) at
the 6-digit of the NAICS classification. For this reason, the latter have been used in studies
that go beyond the U.S. economy (Acemoglu et al., 2009; Antràs and Chor, 2013; Carvalho,
2014; Alfaro et al., 2016, 2019). The main assumption is that technological structure of
supply networks is fixed in the short-medium term, i.e., we have the technological backbone
of a GVC that is similar across countries.
Of course, the main disadvantage is that one does not have geography in U.S. Input-
Output tables. For this reason, we also look at WIOD data that include 43 countries,
including a residual for the rest of the world, and 56 sectors5. In this case, however, the
technological detail is lost because industries are reported at a 2-digit ISIC level. For ex-
ample, in the case of the automotive industry, main intermediate industries producing parts
and components would be classified together with final producers of cars. Geographic de-
tail comes at the expense of technological detail. For this reason, we will adopt U.S. and
multicountry I-O alternatively, depending on which aspect we are interested to look at.
We start by representing the automotive supply networks from WIOD data in Figure
4, where countries (nodes) are indicated by ISO 3-digit codes, and transactions (edges) are
5Another widely used multicountry I-O tables are the ones proposed by EORA MRIO (Lenzen et al.,
2013). For some references where the latter have been used, see for example World Bank (2020b). An
advantage in using EORA is a higher geographic coverage, up to 190 countries. However, the technological
detail is very poor, since it aggregates all the national details within 26 industries.
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weighted considering the amount of flows. Please note that, by excluding industries different
from the automotive, we are also excluding suppliers that do participate to the value chain
(better, network) of the automotive sector. For sake of a clear visualization, we select only
the sub-graph made of nodes and edges indicating flows of parts and components from within
the automotive manufacturing, and crossing national borders. Interestingly, we observe a
strong integration in North-America, on one side, and in the European Union, on the other
side. Both trade areas exchange intermediate inputs two-ways with partners in Asia.
Figure 4: Global automotive network, source: author’s elaboration from WIOD data
Note: The data are sourced from WIOD for year 2014, as this is the latest available year. Nodes and
edges are organized by a force-directed layout, following Fruchterman and Reingold (1991) and using
GEPHI software.
For visualization of networks, we adopt GEPHI, an open access graph platform introduced
by Bastian M. (2009). The platform makes available many graphical layouts for networks,
mainly to organize nodes and edges following some algorithms that locate nodes and relative
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edges depending on the peculiarities of the network structure. In the case of Figure 4, we
picked the Fruchterman and Reingold (1991) force-directed layout, because it organizes any
two nodes considering their attractive force based on the information on weighted exchanges
(edges) of inputs. As a result, the more central node is Germany, because it integrates
strongly with other main partners of the European Union that are at close geographical
distance. In fact, all neighbors (Austria, Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Poland, Denmark,
Belgium, United Kindgom, Netherlands) are present in a closer ring around Germany. On the
other hand, Germany exchanges many intermediate automotive inputs across the Atlantic
with the United States, and in the Far East with China and Japan. Interestingly, however,
the strongest ties are among partners of the former NAFTA (now called USMCA: United
States, Mexico, and Canada Agreement).
From our point of view, the technological centrality of upstream markets is more im-
portant than geographic centrality. Therefore, we switch in Figure 5 to BEA (2002) data.
They allow us to spot the Automobile Manufacturing (code: 336111) after looking at the
entire economy. The visualization by GEPHI is performed picking another alternative force-
directed layout, i.e., the Force Atlas rev. 2 (Jacomy et al., 2014). In fact, we find the
Automotive Manufacturing located on the outskirts of the graph mainly because it is an
industry that delivers to final consumers. Instead, at the center of the graph, we find in-
put industries that are more technologically central because they deliver to other industries.
On the right, we report services industries in red, manufacturing industries in green, and
primary industries in blue.
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Figure 5: The automotive supply network from U.S. Input-Output tables
Note: The data are sourced from BEA (2002). Nodes and edges are organized by a force-directed layout, following Jacomy et al. (2014) and using
GEPHI software. On the left, services industries (in red), manufacturing industries (in green), and primary industries (in blu). On the right, only
top direct inputs of the Automobile Manufacturing (code: 336111) are reported if their direct requirements are above the median.
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An important characteristic of modern economies, which we visualize on the left of Figure
5, is the relevance of services inputs. The most central, for example, are Research and
Development, and Wholesale trade, which are both important for the innovation and the
logistics organization, respectively, of virtually any industry in the rest of the economy. If
we look at the right graph of Figure 5, we find a colored selection for the top direct inputs
of the Automotive Manufacturing, i.e., the direct inputs whose I-O coefficients are above the
median if we consider all input industries of the sector.
Please note, however, that both Figures 4 and 5 provide us an idea of global centrality
by visualizing nodes from the inside out of the graphs, but what we may be interested is a
measure of local centrality. The latter would consider the relative position of each supplier
vis á vis any root node, where the final downstream customer is.
For this purpose, we can look at the Input Rank we can build from the theoretical
framework, υk = e
′
h [I−GA]
−1 ek, which we briefly introduced in Section 1.2. If we fix
sector k to be the Automobile Manufacturing (I-O NAICS code 336111), what we need is
just the I-O table to represent matrix G, and the entries of a diagonal matrix A computed as
a ratio between the total use of intermediate inputs of each representative firm in a sector h
at the numerator and the gross output of the same industry at the denominator. The unitary
vector eh will have a unique entry equal to one when k is the Automotive Manufacturing.
Therefore, in Table 1, we report the top20 (direct and indirect) inputs that are most relevant
for the root industry.
Clearly, the first most technologically relevant input industry for the production process
of the Automobile Manufacturing is the industry itself with a value .1036. Indeed, despite
the 6-digit disaggregation of the industry, we cannot exclude that some intermediate parts
and components are produced in the Automobile Manufacturing, and they are sourced from
6Please note that, by construction, the sum of the Input Rank values of all direct and indirect inputs
will sum up to one. From this perspective, we can interpret Input Rank values as percentage values, i.e., the
percent marginal impact that a distortion on that specific upstream markets h will have on the downstream
buyer in the root industry k.
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within the industry to assemble final cars destined to consumers7.
Table 1: Top 20 inputs for Automobile Manufacturing (code: 336111
Abs. Rank I-O code Industry name Input Rank
1 336111 Automobile Manufacturing .102631
2 336300 Motor Vehicle Parts Manufacturing .056081
3 420000 Wholesale Trade .011838
4 550000 Management of Companies and Enterprises .011031
5 531000 Real Estate .009647
6 331110 Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy Manufacturing .008335
7 211000 Oil and Gas Extraction .007206
8 533000 Lessors of Non-financial Intangible Assets .005214
9 221100 Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution .005164
10 324110 Petroleum Refineries .004916
11 484000 Truck Transportation .004421
12 325190 Other Basic Organical Chemical Manufacturing .004088
13 517000 Telecommunications .004024
14 541800 Advertising and Related Services .003968
15 334413 Semiconductor and Related Device Manufacturing .003706
16 52A000 Monetary Authorities and Depository Credit Intermediation .003572
17 221200 Natural Gas Distribution .002947
18 325211 Plastics Material and Resin Manufacturing .002804
19 32619A Other Plastics Product Manufacturing .002680
20 325110 Petrochemical Manufacturing .002569
Note: Input Rank vector is computed following Rungi et al. (2020) for each using industry among 425
industries classified at the 6-digit in the U.S. BEA 2002 tables.
It is no surprise that the second most relevant input industry is the Motor Vehicle Parts
Manufacturing (code 336300), for which we already have a high direct requirement coeffi-
cient in I-O tables. Less intuitive is the ranking of following input industries. As observed
in Figure 5, services industries play a central role in the entire economy. In the specific
case of the automotive industry, Wholesale Trade services are important for the overall
connectivity of the supply logistics, because they are asked to deliver most of the tangible
inputs that circulate in the production network. Then, what automotive companies derive
from the industry for the Management of Companies and Enterprises (code 550000) are
essentially headquarters services8, in an industry that heavily relies on complex forms of
7This is a general characteristics of I-O table, whatever root industry we pick. The heavy weight of the
diagonal in a I-O table and its consequences for scholars that want to measure sourcing strategies had been
already documented by Alfaro and Charlton (2009).
8Following the original definition included in BLS (2018), we know that the sector comprises ’i) companies
17
corporate governance. Of course, Real Estate (code 531000) services are much important in
a heavy industry where plants for components and final goods are an essential prerequisite
for production. Interestingly, Lessors of Non-financial Intangible Assets are custodians of
intellectual property rights (patents, brands, engineering designs), from which a great source
of competitive advantage is expected. Further down in the ranking, we find energy, financial
services and other manufacturing inputs.
Please note how, in terms of magnitude, there is a huge dispersion across the distribution
of the Input Rank. The impact of a distortion coming from the market for Motor Vehicle
Parts (code 336300) is, at the margin, about eleven times higher than a distortion coming
from Electric Power Generation (code 221100), which is in turn twice bigger than a marginal
impact of a shock coming from Petrochemical Manufacturing (code: 325110).
2 The Smile Curve and value retention
2.1 Who’s smiling now?
The generation and distribution of economic value by firms has gained little attention so
far. Most empirical studies focus on the upgrade and downgrade of countries and industries
along GVCs once looking at metrics that catch the average position in terms of value added
content in trade by extrapolating from multi-country input-output tables9. Yet, the firm-
level value added is a simple albeit useful indicator that has been relatively neglected10 but
it could be useful for the design of evidence-based policies, because it allows:
that hold financial activities (securities or other equity interests) in other companies for the purpose of a
corporate control to influence management decisions; ii) companies that professionally administer, oversee,
and manage other companies through strategic or organizational planning and decision making.’.
9This is the approach taken by many international organizations, including the OECD (2018), the World
Bank (2020b), and the UNCTAD (2019). For seminal references on the decomposition of trade in value
added to avoid multiple counting, see Koopman et al. (2014) and Koopman et al. (2010). The original
problem is to eliminate a multiple accounting of the value of inputs from gross trade available from customs
data when GVCs cross several national borders.
10A notable exception is the ongoing effort by R. and K. (2019)
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1. measuring the distribution of surplus among factors of production (labor and capital)
from participation to GVCs;
2. catching the share of economic value that is retained from GVCs in an industry, a
country or a region.
3. more in general, assessing the heterogeneity of firms within a country, an industry or
a region;
Trivially, by definition, the value added of a firm is the difference between the sales and
the costs of the intermediate inputs that have been used in production. Broadly speaking, if
we sum up value generated by firms, we have an aggregate for the gross product of a country,
industry, or region11.
Thus, what does it mean if a firm is able to add more value than another after selling
its production and paying materials and services? There are two possible non-mutually
exclusive reasons:
(a) A firm is able to generate more value because its products sell better if compared to
competitors, i.e., they have a higher innovative content and/or are perceived as of a
higher quality.
(b) A firm is able to retain some monopolistic rents from the market, unconditional on the
quality or innovation content of its products.
More than often, we can have a combination of both (a) and (b). In fact, depending on
the underlying market conditions, we could compare the notion of firm-level value added with
the theoretical notion of markup, which is the difference between the selling price of a good
and its cost, often expressed as a percentage of the cost. More properly, if we assume that
firms operate in an environment of monopolistic competition, the markup rule is p = ( 1
1+εk
)λ,
where p is price, εk is the elasticity of substitution in the sector k of the firm, and λ is the
11This is the so-called value added approach to estimate GDP at current prices, as for example taken
by Eurostat. Eventually, GDP estimates for some national accounts are based on a combination of detailed
economic census data and other information (e.g. retail sales, housing starts, shipments of capital goods,
etc.) that are not immediately available. For a reference to the U.S. case, see Landefeld et al. (2008).
19
marginal cost. Therefore, under monopolistic competition, markups measure the amount
of profit that producers can make out of products that are differentiated within a sector.
The general assumption is that products are different because of a perceived quality from
consumers, and the elasticity of substitution in a sector catches the propensity of consumers
to switch from one producer to another.
In this case, there are two main differences between the notions of firm-level markups and
the value added content12. Markups do not consider the role of labor services, because labor
(marginal) costs are yet another component of the overall marginal cost, besides the marginal
cost of materials. Markups are obtained at the margin, i.e., considering the additional unit
sold, whereas value added is derived by construction looking ex post at average prices of
both sold units and used factors.
In other words, a measure of value added content at the firm level cannot be used to
understand the pricing rule of the firm, nor it can be used to disentangle its market power
from competitiveness13. Yet, it retains informative power on the generation and distribution
of economic value at a finer-grained level than aggregate industries and countries retrieved
from I-O tables.
A firm can be able to generate more or less value in a particular stage of the GVC for a
given combination of production factors (e.g. labor skills, degree of innovation, productivity,
etc.), on one hand, and in relationship with the characteristics of a specific production task,
on the other hand (e.g., competition environment, knowledge intensity, demand and supply
shocks, etc.). It can participate to GVCs and be able to retain an amount of surplus that is
12A proper microeconomic investigation of the notion of value added would be useful but beyond the
scope of this methodological paper. We can just assume that the value added content can be written as
p(q)·q−m(q)·q
p(q)·q , where p(q) is an inverse demand function, i.e., the price at which q can be sold given the
existing demand, and m(q) is the demand of intermediate inputs, i.e., the goods and services purchased on
the market to process sold units. Computing it from simple accounting identities, we are not making any
assumption on the underlying market environment.
13Please note how similar considerations can be extended to aggregate measures of value added at the
country and industry level, as the ones from (multi-country) I-O tables. Different industries and countries
may entail different market environments that are usually neglected in GVC studies.
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very different from similar firms across industries and countries. Therefore, the higher the
amount of surplus retained from GVCs, the higher the possibility to distribute compensations
to labor and capital.
In the following paragraphs, we will show how a smile curve analysis can track the gen-
eration and distribution of value added from firm-level databases. The concept of a smiling
curve was first proposed by the founder of ACER, Stan Shih, who observed how both ends
of his company’s value chain were bringing higher profits than the middle part (Shih, 1996;
Alcacer and Oxley, 2014). Hence, business scholars took inspiration and conceptualized the
smile curve as a graph of how much economic value varies across the different production
functions bringing the final products to consumers. Beyond business studies, the notion of a
smiling curve has been since widely used by international organizations (OECD, 2013; UNC-
TAD, 2016), and a few scholars (Baldwin and Gonzalez, 2015; Meng et al., 2020) to discuss
the possibly unequal gains from specialization across GVCs in developing and developed
countries.
For the first time at the firm-level, Rungi and Del Prete (2018) performed an exercise
on about 2.3 million firms active in the European Union in 2015 and showed that, indeed,
a smile curve exists for the ensemble of manufacturing and services tasks. In Figure 6, we
report the visualization of a fitted smile curve in a 99 percent confidence interval. On the
x-axis, we report an ideal technological sequence measured by a so-called Downstreamness
metrics originally proposed by Antràs and Chor (2013), whereas on the y-axis we report
the fitted values of firm-level value added content in production, which we calculate as a
ratio between the value added of a firm and its total sales. The smiling shape of Figure 6
is the result of a semiparametric polynomial function (Royston and Altman, 1994) of the
value content on the Downstreamness, while controlling for firms’ and market characteristics.
The curvature indicates that tasks in the middle of the technological sequence generate on
average relatively less value.
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Figure 6: The Smile Curve in the European Union
Source: Rungi and Del Prete (2018). The exercise is performed on about 2.3 million of firms of any
industry in the European Union. On the x-axis, the Downstreamness measure is sourced from Antràs
and Chor (2013). On the y-axis, firm-level value added content is computed as valueaddedtotalsales . The curve is
the result of a fractional polinomial regression following Royston and Altman (1994).
The latter finding seems in line with the hypothesis that less knowledge-intensive tasks,
like for example the production and assembly of parts and components, do not allow firms to
reap the same gains from GVCs as if they were specialized in relatively more knowledge in-
tensive tasks, like for example R&D, engineering, marketing and other so-called headquarters
services14.
2.2 A firm-level sample for the automotive global supply chain
In this Section, we introduce a firm-level sample for the automotive global supply chain as
a case study of one of the most pervasive and relevant industries, with about 95 million
vehicles produced around the world OICA (2019). Well before the pandemic crisis, the
14Baldwin and Evenett (2015) also speculate that there could have been ’tilts’ in the smile curve over the
last decades, because the production of intermediates and their assembly becomes less and less knowledge
intensive, and generate on average relatively less value. The latter finding seems in line with the hypothesis
that less knowledge-intensive tasks, like for example the production and assembly of parts and components,
do not allow firms to reap the same gains from GVCs as if they were specialized in relatively more knowledge
intensive tasks, like for example R&D, engineering, marketing and other so-called headquarter services.
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European Commission (2018) estimated that the automotive industry represented 6.1% of
total EU employment, providing direct and indirect jobs to about 13.8 million of Europeans.
Following OICA (2019), we know that the EU and the EFTA countries provide altogether
about 19% of the vehicles sold around the world in 2018, down from about 27% registered
in 2005. In absolute values, EU and EFTA producers were still delivering about 18.1 million
motor vehicles both in 2005 and 2018, although Chinese producers emerged on a global
stage in the same period, mainly as a consequence of an increase of demand from emerging
countries.
Based on the definitions provided in Section 1, the automotive supply chain is made by
all firms, wherever located, which exchange physical or intangible inputs for the completion
of the final products. In this respect, a GVC of the automotive industry can include both
manufacturing and services suppliers, whether they contribute directly or indirectly to the
production process, and wherever they are located. To get an idea of how complex the
production of a car is, Berlingieri et al. (2018) reports that about 500 components are
needed as made of about 30,000 individual pieces at the moment they arrive to a factory to
be assembled. In turn, each component requires the work of other direct or indirect suppliers.
As far as we know, there is no comprehensive firm-level database that can catch the
actual extent of any GVC, let alone the one established by the automotive industry. Ideally,
one needs to collect data on all the firms and their input/output transactions at a global
level. The second best option is to look at firm-level financial accounts and rely on their
industry affiliations to derive their GVC positions.
In Table 2, we identify a list of industries that participate to the production process of
the motor vehicles, and then we look at the firm-level financial accounts of firms active in
those industries. Following the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA,
2012), we find a first perimeter of the automotive supply chain to which we add a set of
industries that we believe were missing from the original list. In this way, we obtain a
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broader definition of the automotive supply chain, thus separating between manufacturing
inputs, services inputs, production, sales and aftersales services.
For our purpose, we source firm-level financial accounts from Orbis, by Bureau van Dijk,
in the period 2000 - 2017. In the third column of Table 2, we report the number of firms
for which we can find the elementary accounts needed to estimate value added content. As
it is evident, the final producers of motor vehicles (NACE rev. 2 code 291) are just a small
share of the entire sample. Clearly, in absence of actual shipments of inputs, we are aware
that our sample includes many firms that can participate to several supply chains. This
is particularly evident in the case of services suppliers. We cannot exclude them from the
analysis, given their crucial contribution to the GVC, but we are aware that their services
can have a more general purpose and be delivered to suppliers not related to the automotive
supply chain.
From an operative point of view, it implies that:
• we cannot attribute the entire value produced by these firms (and industries) solely to
the automotive supply chain;
• we assume that, within each supplying industry, there is no difference between the
average (tangible or intangible) input delivered to the automotive supply chain and
the average (tangible and intangible) input that does not.
24
Table 2: Firms and industries on the automotive supply chain
NACE rev.2 Industry name N. firms % In ACEA(2012)
MANUFACTURING SUPPLIERS
2060 Manufacture of man-made fibres 545 0.06% No
2030 Manufacture of paints, varnishes, and similar coatings, printing ink and mastices 4,761 0.56% No
2211 Manufacture of rubber tyres and tubes; retreading and rebuilding of rubber tyres 841 0.10% Yes
271 Manufacture of electric motors, generators, transformers and electricity distribution 9,509 1.13% Yes
272 Manufacture of batteries and accumulators 685 0.08% No
273 Manufacture of wiring and wiring devices 2,303 0.27% No
274 Manufacture of electric lighting equipment 5,224 0.62% No
2815 Manufacture of bearings, gears, gearing and driving elements 1,507 0.18% Yes
2825 Manufacture of non-domestic cooling and ventilation equipment 3,756 0.45% Yes
292 Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers 2,988 0.36% Yes
293 Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles 16,380 1.95% Yes
SERVICES SUPPLIERS
61 Telecommunications 16,729 1.99% No
62 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 99,655 11.85% No
63 Information service activities 28,406 3.38% No
69 Legal and accounting services 112,406 13.36% No
70 Activities of head office; management consultancy activities 117,444 13.96% No
7112 Engineering activities and related technical consultancy 76,618 9.11% No
7120 Technical testing and analysis 15,442 1.84% No
73 Advertising and market research 60,207 7.16% No
74 Other professional, scientific and technical activities 74,211 8.82% No
PRODUCTION
291 Manufacture of motor vehicles 46,214 5.49% Yes
SALE
451 Sale of motor vehicles 46,214 5.49% Yes
453 Sale of motor vehicles parts and accessories 48,438 5.76% Yes
4540 Sale, maintenance and repair of motorcycles and related parts and accessories 8,508 1.01% No
AFTERSALE
452 Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles 74,088 8.81% Yes
771 Renting and leasing of motor vehicles 11,925 1.42% No
Total 841,138 100.00%
Note: Firm-level data are sourced from Orbis, by Bureau Van Dijk (a Moody’s Analytics Company).
The table considers only firms for which value added or original data on sales and materials can be
retrieved. The perimeter of the automotive supply chain is derived from ACEA (2012), to which we
manually add a selection of other relevant industries.
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Table 3: Geographic coverage
Host economy N. firms %
European Union (28) 494,817 59.77%
Other Europe 79,740 9.63%
Russia and CIS 121,263 14.65%
North America 888 0.11%
South and Central America 20,005 2.42%
Africa and Middle East 1,418 0.17%
South-East Asia 109,217 13.19%
Oceania 466 0.06%
Total 827,814 100.00%
Note: Host economy is derived by looking at the country where the company is legally registered. Please
note that we exclude firms that report missing information on the country of registration.
Finally, in Table 3 we report the geographic coverage by main hosting region. Firms
from our sample come from about 127 countries. The most represented area in terms of
number of firms is the European Union, followed by the aggregate including Russia and
the Commonwealth of Independent States, and then by South-East Asian countries. Please
note how a main concern regards the coverage of North America (US, Canada and Mexico),
where only 888 firms from any industry are retrieved. As far as we know, there is no external
source that we can compare for a sample validation. The main reason for missing values
in the United States is because financial accounts do not include details for value added or
material costs. Yet, we do know that the North American producers, especially from US,
are among the most active on global markets, and we expect a sample selection bias that we
must address in following analyses.
2.3 The Smile Curve of the automotive supply chain
In Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6, we plot preliminary evidence elaborated from the sample
of firms described in the previous section. We reclassify industries by business functions, as
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they are approximately ordered starting from services inputs (including, among others, en-
gineering, technical testing, advertising, headquarter services, etc.) through manufacturing
suppliers, then reaching final production, sale and aftersales services.
In boxplots of Figure 7, we observe the existence of an asymmetric smiley curve in the
median values by looking at the red squared dots. Indeed, services inputs generate on average
a greater share of value added content in production, even if interquartile ranges catch a
great degree of heterogeneity at the firm level, in an interval from 24 to 82 percent. Such
heterogeneity at the firm level can be explained by both characteristics of the firms and by
peculiarities of the market environment. A more specific econometric strategy in Section 2.4
controls for confounding factors. On the other hand, both manufacturing suppliers and final
producers generate on average a much smaller share of value content, and the interquartile
ranges are narrower, in an interval between 14 and 38 percent. Sales and aftersales show a
slighter higher variation from about 15 to 43 percent.
In a nutshell, the stages that contribute the most value to the automotive supply chain are
to be found among services inputs, whereas the simple production of cars and the provision
of parts and components have both a relatively lower value added content.
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Figure 7: The Smile Curve of the automotive supply chain
Note: Value added content is computed as valueaddedsales . On the x-axis, business functions follow the classification introduced in Table 2. Red
squared dots show median values, and boxplots indicate interquartile ranges.
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Figure 8: Heterogeneity within hosting economies
Note: Value added content is computed as valueaddedsales . Densities include firms from any industry reported
in Table 2. From the upper panel, we report: i) EU 15 old members (Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
and United Kingdom); ii) New Member State (Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia); iii) non-EU countries.
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In Figure 8, we explore the heterogeneity of firm-level value added in the European
Union and elsewhere. Interestingly, a common feature of all panels in this Figure is a sort
of bimodality in the distributions. A bunch of firms piles on the right tails, mainly from
services inputs, as they are able to generate a higher share of value, while a variable share
of firms locate at a distance on the left tails, mainly providing manufacturing inputs. No-
tably, firms outside the European Union, both in manufacturing and in services, generate
much less value than firms operating in the European Union: 38 and 53 percent, respectively.
Figure 9: Distribution of value among production factors
Note: Labor, capital, and tax shares are derived from firm level financial accounts, computed as ratio
where denominators are costs of employees, profits, and taxation, respectively. Business functions are
derived from classification of industries as in Table 2. Boxplots represent interquartile ranges and
centered lines are median values.
Eventually, in Figure 9 we track how value is distributed to compensate production
factors. From firm-level financial accounts, we have costs for employees (including social
charges and retirements costs) and profits. We can further retrieve information on tax
payments. They are all taken as ratios over value added. Therefore, the boxplots give us
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an idea of how much compensations can vary within and across business functions. The
labor and capital shares are calculated as simple ratios on the value added. Remarkably,
interquartile ranges are always wide for both capital and labor compensations. We do find
a great degree of heterogeneity also in how value is distributed among production factors.
Yet, prima facie, there is no differential pattern across business functions.
2.4 Patterns of domestic value retention
In this Section, we test the hypothesis that activities performed by domestic companies
generate on average a higher value added content than activities performed by foreign firms.
For this scope, we introduce the following basic strategy:
yickt = γo + γ1domi + γ2Xit + ϑk + ρct + εickt (3)
where the dependent variable ickt is the (log of) value added content of a firm i located
in a country c operating in an industry k at time t. Therefore, our main coefficient of in-
terest is γ1, which indicate whether a domestic-owned firm has a value added premium over
foreign-owned firms, because domi is a binary variable equal to one if the ultimate owner
of company i is a country resident, and zero otherwise15. The matrix Xit gathers firm con-
trols including firm size, capital intensity and, labor productivity. Industry fixed effects ϑk
control for time-invariant task characteristics, for example an implicit higher or lower sub-
stitutability among producers. Country-per -time fixed effects ρct control for time-varying
peculiarities of the hosting economy, including for example different business environments
or corporate tax rates. Errors are clustered three-way for industry, country-time, and origin
country, following the procedure by Cameron et al. (2011). Results are reported in Tables
15For our scope, we collect information on companies ownership and classify them following international
standards for the identification of corporate control structures (OECD, 2005; UNCTAD, 2009, 2016), accord-
ing to which a company is foreign-owned if a parent company controls an outright majority of voting rights
(50% plus one stake). Similar data on multinational enterprises have been used in Alviarez et al. (2017),
Cravino and Levchenko (2016), and Del Prete and Rungi (2017)
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4, 5, 6, 7, thus considering all countries, the entire European Union, and then separately the
older EU 15 Members and the New Member States.
Table 4: Domestic value added retention - All countries
Dependent variable: All Services inputs Manuf inputs Production Sales & after
value added contentit
Domestici .0098** .0121** .0238*** .0607*** -.0021
(.0049) (.0013) (.0052) (.0188) (.0022)
N. obs. 547,073 360,077 89,421 3,451 90,321
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hosting country × Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Three-way clustered errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared .462 .315 .320 .376 .523
Note: Errors are clustered by industry, hosting country-per -year, and origin country following Cameron
et al. (2011). **, *** stand for p-value< .05 and p-value< .01, respectively.
Table 5: Domestic value added retention - European Union 28
Dependent variable: All Services inputs Manuf inputs Production Sales & after
value added contentit
Domestici .0151*** .0162*** .0328*** .0728*** -.0003
(.0047) (.0053) (.0065) (.0194) (.0031)
N. obs. 412,517 294,081 40,888 1,593 73,730
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hosting country × Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Three-way clustered errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared .429 .278 .174 .347 .539
Note: Errors are clustered by industry, hosting country-per -year, and origin country following Cameron
et al. (2011). **, *** stand for p-value< .05 and p-value< .01, respectively.
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Table 6: Domestic value added retention - European Union 15
Dependent variable: All Services inputs Manuf inputs Production Sales & after
value added contentit
Domestici .0190*** .0192*** .0385*** .0761*** -.0041
(.0057) (.0059) (.0072) (.0203) (.0046)
N. obs. 355,188 237,494 31,044 1,369 63,433
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hosting country × Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Three-way clustered errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared .407 .232 .191 .309 .505
Note: Companies are located in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. Errors are clustered by
industry, hosting country-per -year, and origin country following Cameron et al. (2011). **, *** stand
for p-value< .05 and p-value< .01, respectively.
Table 7: Domestic value added retention - European Union NMS
Dependent variable: All Services inputs Manuf inputs Production Sales & after
value added contentit
Domestici .0203 .0171 .0438 .0310 .0291**
(.0144) (.0133) (.0320) (.0434) (.0118)
N. obs. 77,326 56,584 9,844 224 10,296
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hosting country × Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Three-way clustered errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared .446 .320 .213 .348 .578
Note: Companies are located in Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia. Errors are clustered by industry, hosting
country-per -year, and origin country following Cameron et al. (2011). **, *** stand for p-value< .05
and p-value< .01, respectively.
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When we look at the entire sample in Table 4, we detect a pattern of value added
retention in the domestic country. This is particularly true in the case of the European
Union, which represents the bulk of our sample, in Table 5. Overall, we register a higher
value added content if the company is domestic-owned, specifically in the cases of services
inputs, manufacturing inputs, and final production. On the contrary, aftersales activities are
not significantly different when we consider ownership.
Interestingly, premia are always higher for firms engaged in final production, on the fourth
columns across tables. In the EU subsample, domestic firms generate up to 7.3% more value
added than foreign-owned firms. The lowest albeit significant difference is detected in the
case of services inputs, in which case domestic-owned firms retain up to 1.6% more value
added in the EU.
Within EU, value added content is higher for domestic firms in old EU 15 members, as
shown in Table 6, while there is no significant difference in value added content in New EU
Member States overall, when we look at Table 7, with the exception of aftersales activities16.
Please note that previous results can be interpreted only in terms of correlations. We
do control for many time-invariant characteristics of countries and industries, given our
specification in eq. (3), but there may still be several reasons why domestic ownership
correlates with a higher value added content.
On one hand, there could be a deliberate choice of producers to retain in the resident
country the activities that generate a higher value because they are the ones where compet-
itive advantage is. As from our findings, however, higher value added can be generated (and
retained) across all business functions, except for aftersales services.
On the other hand, we cannot exclude that some countries more than other can favor
value added retention within domestic firms, given for example the institutional environment,
16In Appendix, we include a table with value added retention by single EU countries. A main difference
between EU15 and NMS is still there, but with some exceptions, e.g., Belgium has a negative coefficient and
Bulgaria has a positive coefficient.
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the regulation of labor markets, the competitive environment. It seems to be the case when
we compare results in Tables 6 and 7.
Finally, we cannot exclude that some governance solutions allow some firms to generate
and retain more economic value from across the GVC, due for example to some form of
monopolistic or monopsonistic power. We briefly introduce this topic in Section 3.1
Indeed, we remember from Section 2.1 that a firm-level value added content includes
both a markup and a labor component. Both components can be the outcome of different
equilibria in the capital and labor markets. In other words, there can be unobserved char-
acteristics of the demand and the supply in both capital and labor markets that can drive
our preliminary findings, and which require further investigation.
3 The geographic dimension of Global Value Chains
3.1 An organizational problem
Following the general definition we introduced at the beginning, any firm that buys or sells
intermediate inputs is plugged into a value chain, be it domestic or global, where many other
producers interact on a more or less sophisticated web of supply relationships. Therefore,
an organizational problem arises for which different solutions are possible. How do firms
coordinate their activities?
One possibility is that companies just operate through market relationships, they sign
supply contracts among independent parties, and they exchange arms’ length the intermedi-
ate goods and services that are needed. That is a world where the market does coordination.
Yet, more than often, a lead firm emerges that has some market or technological advantage.
Depending on the effort spent by the lead firm in the coordination of the supply chain, the
governance can become more relational or hierarchical. Relational governance has a lower
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level of chain governance because the lead firm acknowledges other buyers/suppliers their
unique competences and, thus, a high degree of independence. Chain governance starts
getting more hierarchical when the lead firm provides a high level of support and retains a
higher governance power. The higher the integration with a lead firm, the more likely it is
that exclusive contracts are signed, and therefore some monopsonistic or monopolistic power
is exerted, for which the lead firm internalizes a share of the economic surplus.
In fact, most studies often consider firms as if they were operating in a single supply
chain, i.e., with a single customer downstream and a single buyer downstream, assuming
they have exclusive contracts. While this is often the rule in quasi-hierarchical chains, firms
in modular or market relationships more likely engage with multiple value chains, possibly
subject to various forms of governance, hence serving a variety of national and international
markets.
The latter is an important element to consider when one wants to consider the costs
and benefits of participating in GVCs, as it has been often discussed regarding developing
countries (Amendolagine et al., 2019; Navas-Alemán, 2011). Eventually, a fully hierarchical
supply chain is made by parent companies that coordinate subsidiaries from headquarters.
When the coordination span across different countries, we have a fully-grown multinational
enterprise (MNE).
It follows from previous considerations that there is an important link between the or-
ganization problem faced by firms participating in GVCs, and their ability to generate and
retain economic value, therefore upgrading or updating their production processes when it
is necessary to stay competitive. There is no automatic guarantee that new technologies can
spread and skills can be built by participating in GVCs, because there is always a possibility
that some governance solutions keep some producers stacked in lower value added activities,
while keeping for lead firms headquarters services (R&D, engineering, design, etc.) that
provide competitive advantages.
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In this context, the most coveted production stages are R&D services. Not by chance,
their role and location along GVCs are the most studies (see, among others, Belderbos et al.
(2016)). In fact, R&D labs are traditionally the least internationalised business functions,
although a growing number of MNEs are starting to offshore them more than in the past.
Concerns are increasingly raised that they tend to relocate next to where factories have
been already offshored, because the lab and the plant interact better in physical proxim-
ity. Castellani and Lavoratori (2020) find that the propensity to co-locate is higher among
firms that have less international experience, whose supply chain is less geographically dis-
persed, and whose share of intangible assets is lower. In this respect, co-location appears
as a substitute for the firms’ ability to coordinate complex organizational structures at a
distance. Therefore, bigger MNEs are better positioned to exploit the benefits of production
unbundling across countries, while smaller firms should be aware of the difficulties coming
from geographic dispersion.
Figure 10: Location choices along GVCs
Note: Author’s drawing based on Mudambi (2008)
Let’s grasp the intuition of the organizational problems by looking at Figure 10. This is a
partial modification of an original drawing from Mudambi (2008). Firms from more advanced
and developing economies can participate to the smiley curve, however the locations that
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are able to attract investments on the segments of the smiley curve that generate more value
are also the ones that could benefit from a higher growth potential. Eventually, these are
also the most strategic stages of production, where intangible assets are generated. Patents,
brands, best managerial practices feed value into the rest of the supply chain.
In this context, we can assume that there is a simultaneous and triple trade-off problem
to solve when choosing a GVC governance. A producer has to decide:
1. whether to locate a production stage in physical proximity to other producers, and to
which producers, depending on the logistics and coordination costs that such a choice
entails;
2. whether to invest or not in an upgrade to move towards higher-value segments, de-
pending on the costs of building skills and invest in intangible assets;
3. whether to vertically integrate into a hierarchical chain, e.g. an MNE, depending on
the coordination costs of a bigger corporate structures, as a parent or as a subsidiary.
Clearly, each of the previous choice is linked to the others, and they are all heavily
influenced by the local business environment and institutional context.
3.2 Are there co-location patterns along GVCs?
Quantitative analysis on the geography of firms’ location revolves around two notions of
agglomeration economies and market selection, and how to separate them (Combes and
Gobillon, 2015; Combes et al., 2012). The idea is that firms are more productive, on average,
when they tend to locate in proximity because they can benefit from local interactions across
different dimensions, including the possibility to find local suppliers of tangible and intangible
inputs. On the other hand, larger agglomerations of firms toughen competition, allowing only
the most productive to survive. Thus, the presence of areas more densely populated by firms
can generate relevant geographical disparities in the allocation of productive resources within
countries or regions (Fontagné and Santoni, 2018).
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In many related works, the presence of local supply chains is assumed implicitly as
a location advantage, but never explicitly studied per se. Even the notion of industrial
districts, which dates back to Marshall (1920), tends to identify areas in which there is
a prevalence of small-medium and specialized companies, where different externalities and
complementarities can boost spillovers. Among externalities and complementarities, local
suppliers may have a role (Porter et al., 2009; Porter, 1990). Yet, recent investigations
claim that agglomeration economies and industrial districts become less relevant in times of
a global production unbundling, because many traditional strengths turns into weaknesses,
including the relatively smaller size (Cainelli et al., 2018; Giunta et al., 2012).
The bad news is that, as far as we know, nobody has really evaluated the evolution of
firms’ local agglomerations in times of GVCs. In the previous Section 3.1, we discussed recent
results regarding the co-location of R&D labs in proximity of productive plants (Castellani
and Lavoratori, 2020; Belderbos et al., 2016), but we do not know of any systematic analysis
that checks explicitly for different production stages along GVCs.
On the other hand, the good news is that finer-grained geographic information from
firm-level data is increasingly available. In preparation of a study on this topic, we started
processing firm-level addresses from Orbis, by Bureau Van Dijk, to obtain geographic coor-
dinates and identify firms’ local agglomeration. Here we present first efforts from the subset
of automotive manufacturing firms located in Italy and active in the period 2010-2017. We
consider the whole 2-digit NACE rev. 2 code for the automotive industry, including a total
of 2,657 firms that deliver either final or intermediate manufactured goods.
From our point of view, Italy is a showcase of a country where there is a long tradition
of industrial districts Becattini (1990), and where the presence of the automotive industry
is non-negligible. Our first effort was to bring firm-level addresses from Orbis to geographic
coordinates using a combination of Googlemaps and Openstreetmap.17 After further data
17Please note that for some companies in Orbis we did find already information on latitudes and longitudes
for a smaller subset of firms, but after a series of random checks we did not find correspondence between
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processing, we reconstruct the entry and exit on a year-by-year basis, and import data on
ArcGis, the well-known mapping software. In Table A1, we report the time coverage show-
ing differences that take into account both exits and new entries, based on the legal status
information available from financial accounts.
Table 8: Time coverage of automotive manufacturing (NACE code 29) in Italy
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
N. firms 2,657 2,601 2,538 2,498 2,490 2,489 2,490 2,497
Note: Number of firms changes by considering the exit of inactive companies and the entry of newly-born
companies, based on information from the legal status and the incorporation dates available from Orbis,
by Bureau Van Dijk. Only firms with complete addresses are included.
First maps are reported in following Figures 11 and 12, 13, and 14. In the first map,
we check for areas that are more densely populated by automotive companies, and we find
that there are several areas of agglomeration around the peninsula, more concentrated in
the North than in the South of the country. Yet, at this stage, we can say that the sector
is widespread in different areas, i.e., we cannot really think of an exclusive district for the
automotive chain. Clearly, the automotive producers do not really fit in the traditional
notion of an industrial district, because they cannot afford small size. Production of final
cars and parts and components requires some minimum efficient scale of production, usually
higher than other lighter industries.
those and the correct ones, mainly because the municipality was not correctly specified, and there were
similar names for streets and squares in other municipalities.
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Figure 11: Clustering firms of the automotive manufacturing in Italy - year 2017
Note: Firms are clustered by number if operating in the NACE rev. 2 29 industry.
Figure 12: Mapping automotive subsectors in Italy - year 2017
Note: Firms are clustered by number by each subsector in the NACE rev. 2 29 industry.
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Figure 13: Mapping employment in the Italian automotive - year 2017
Note: Values are aggregated from local firms in the NACE rev. 2 29 industry.
Figure 14: Mapping value added in the Italian automotive - year 2017
Note: Note: Values are aggregated from local firms in the NACE rev. 2 29 industry.
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When we look at Figure 12, it is evident that there is no specific pattern of co-location
between producers of final goods and parts and components, at least at this scale. There are
plants for equipment, coachwork and trailers scattered all around the entire territory, albeit
relatively less present in the South and on the Islands. Eventually, the lack of specialization
seems evident also after we weigh the geographical presence by considering local aggregates
of employees and value added, in Figures 13 and 14. Clearly, the most relevant areas are
Piedmont and Lombardy, where bigger agglomeration go well beyond the administrative
borders of the regions. Bigger plants, like the one in Melfi, in the South of the country, do
show their higher size both in terms of occupation and value added, but they do not always
come with an agglomeration of satellite businesses in the parts and components.
Clearly, what we miss here is the ensemble of services inputs, which in most cases we
cannot attribute exclusively to one single industry. We discussed this point in Section 1.4. In
fact, most business services tend to locate in urban areas, where they can sell their services
to many clients, including the ones from the automotive industry. In this case, as well, we
could not claim that they tend to co-locate next to the automotive supply chain.
3.3 Conclusion
In this contribution, we discuss how firm-level data and Input-Output tables can combine to
analyze the competitive position of firms in Global Value Chains. For this purpose, we make
use of some stylized facts that we derive from the automotive supply chain, as the latter is
one of the most relevant and pervasive in the European economy.
First of all, we show that the complex configuration of most production processes requires
switching to a network approach while considering the case of a ’chain’ as a corner solution
of simpler buyer-supplier relationships. Therefore, we show how I-O tables can be used to
visualize the central position of industries and countries in an entire economy, and we show
how recent theoretical advances in production networks allow constructing consistent metrics
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for ranking inputs. Eventually, we discuss how a production network analysis is particularly
suitable to understand the impact of different shocks in a modern economy, including the
ones from a pandemic crisis. For example, in the case of the automotive producers, we find
that they are particularly sensitive to what happens on upstream services industries.
In the second part of this contribution, we propose a measure of firm-level value added
content to catch the generation and distribution of economic surplus from participation in
GVCs. Although a bulk of the empirical analyses on GVCs extracts information from multi-
country I-O tables, we argue that a simple indicator extracted from financial accounts allows
better catching the heterogeneous response of firms to a global unbundling in production.
For example, in the case of the automotive supply chain, we showed how service inputs are
the ones that generate the highest value, while a final assembly of cars is a more standard
production stage that generates lower value. Interestingly, we find that domestic producers
usually retain a higher share of value added across all business functions, excluding aftersales,
up to a 7.3% in the case of EU final producers.
Finally, in the third part, we show how firm-level data can be used to detect geographic
agglomerations of economic activities at a finer-grained level, and thus study changing loca-
tion patterns over time. After we derive latitudes and longitudes from firms’ postal addresses,
we show the case of automotive producers in Italy, and we visualize how production of in-
termediate inputs scatters all across the territory, thus forming several denser areas but not
unique districts of co-location in the proximity of final producers.
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Table A1: Value added retention in EU countries
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